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Assignments of Book Debts – outright transfers of rights or 
unregistered securities? 
 
Professor Peter Walton
 
 
Businesses are increasingly being financed by receivables financiers who take assignments of 
a company’s book debts. The receivables finance industry is estimated to be worth over €1.6 
trillion across Europe with the U.K. market leading the way. In the event that the company 
goes bust, the assigned book debts are swept away by the financier, as legal owner, and 
consequently what is often the only significant asset of a company is not available to the 
general body of creditors.  
 
The financier will either give notice to the debtor at the time of taking the assignment (“debt 
factoring”) or delay such notice until sometime later (“invoice discounting”). The accepted 
wisdom is that such agreements are absolute assignments and not security interests and 
therefore do not require registration under the Companies Act 2006.  
 
This article considers the history of assignments of book debts and suggests that an equitable 
assignment of a debt is not an out-and-out transfer of the debt but operates by way of charge. 
Such an agreement is therefore a security interest which is void against other creditors 
without registration. Although the invoice discounter may convert the equitable assignment 
into a legal assignment by giving notice to the debtor, if that notice is subsequent to the 
commencement of a formal insolvency process, that notice will be of no effect. 
  
                                                          

 Professor of Insolvency Law, University of Wolverhampton. I am grateful to the comments and suggestions of 
the anonymous referees. Any remaining errors or poor exposition are entirely my own responsibility. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
In recent years, those providing finance to a trading company have increasingly looked to 
take an absolute assignment of debts owed to the company. Those financiers can realise the 
assigned debts in their own right and for their own benefit if the company in question 
becomes insolvent. The debt has been transferred and therefore belongs to the financier rather 
than the company. Although it is clear that a legal assignment of a debt transfers absolute 
ownership of the debt to the assignee, there remain questions as to whether equitable 
assignments, which are frequently taken by financiers, also have this effect.  
The purpose of this article is to consider the nature of equitable assignments of legal 
choses in action
1
 (typically book debts
2
 owed to a company).
3
  It will be necessary to 
consider some of the problems afflicting law and equity leading up to the Judicature Act 
1873
4
 and, in the context of assignments, the conundrum created by the wording of that Act. 
It is clear that the introduction of the legal assignment in 1873 did not impact upon the 
operation and efficacy of equitable assignments.
5
  It will be suggested that an equitable 
assignment of a debt does not transfer absolute ownership rights to the assignee but merely 
creates an equitable charge over the debt.
6
 An equitable charge is a form of security interest 
where no title, legal or equitable, passes to the assignee. If it is not registered under the 
Companies Act 2006, it is void against a company’s other creditors.7  
Although the nature of equitable assignments is of academic interest to students of 
contract law, it is also of enormous practical relevance to many who provide business 
finance. There is a wide global debate on what constitutes a security interest and whether, to 
ensure transparency and certainty, such interests should be subject to registration.
8
 
The article will begin by explaining how a great many UK companies are today provided 
with finance on the basis that they assign their book debts to a financier. The reasons for the 
recent popularity of this type of financing agreement will be explained as will the different 
types of assignments which may be taken. The distinction between legal and equitable 
                                                          
1
 This term is adopted throughout the article to signify a right to bring an action at law rather than in Equity. 
2
 A company’s “book debts” are generally defined as including those debts which, in the ordinary course of 
business, would be entered in well-kept books of a company (see Paul & Frank Ltd v Discount Bank (Overseas) 
Ltd [1967] Ch 348). 
3
 For a clear exposition of the law generally upon equitable and legal assignments of choses in action see eg E. 
Peel Treitel on the Law of  Contract (14
th
 ed London: Sweet and Maxwell, 2015) Chapter 15. 
4
 Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1873 (36 & 37 Vict, c 66). 
5
 William Brandt’s Sons & Co v Dunlop Rubber Co Ltd [1905] AC 454 at 461. 
6
 Building upon the excellent work of J. Edelman and S. Elliott “Two conceptions of equitable assignment” 
(2015) 131 Law Quarterly Review 228 discussed below in Part IV. 
7
 It is assumed for the purposes of this article that such assignments are not exempt from Companies Act 
registration requirements under the Financial Collateral Arrangements (No 2) Regulations 2003 (SI 2003/3226) 
as amended. For a consideration of the Regulations and how they may exclude some assignments of, or charges 
over, book debts, from the registration requirements of the Companies Act 2006, see eg R. Calnan Taking 
Security Law and Practice (2
nd
 ed Bristol: Jordans, 2011) at paras 3.288 – 3.300 6.83-6.87 and L. Gullifer and J. 
Payne Corporate Finance Law (2
nd
 ed Oxford: Hart, 2015) at 7.3.4. 
8
 See, for example, the UNCITRAL Guide on the Implementation of a Security Rights Registry (2014) found at: 
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/security/Security-Rights-Registry-Guide-e.pdf (last accessed 7
th
 
September 2018) and the UNCITRAL Model Law on Secured Transactions (2016) at: 
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/security/ML_ST_E_ebook.pdf (last accessed 7
th
 September 2018). 
Many countries around the world have adopted a personal property secured transactions registration system 
based on the UNCITRAL model law or similar (see, for example, Kenya’s Movable Property Security Rights 
Act 2017). Closer to home useful reference may be made to the Discussion Draft Secured Transactions Code 
and Commentary produced by the City of London Law Society Financial Law Committee found at: 
http://www.citysolicitors.org.uk/attachments/article/121/Draft%20Secured%20Transaction%20Code%20-
%20Commentary%20-%20July%202016.pdf (last accessed 7
th
 September 2018).  
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assignments will be explored with reference to case law, legislation and commentaries. The 
nature of the rights given to an equitable assignee will be contrasted with those of a legal 
assignee, specifically in the context of the formal insolvency of the assignor.  
 
II. MODERN BUSINESS FINANCE 
 
Businesses need finance. Although the way in which finance has been made available to 
businesses has changed over the centuries, some fundamental principles remain unaltered. 
Those providing finance will always wish to protect themselves in the event that the business 
fails. One significant recent development has been the reaction by banks to the effective loss 
of their fixed charge on book debts.
9
 In modern trading conditions, the only asset which many 
companies are able to offer to banks as security is their ledger of book debts (current and 
future).  
As it is now not usually feasible for a lender effectively to police a fixed charge on 
book debts,
10
 the banks have in recent years moved away from taking security over book 
debts towards purchasing book debts at a price less than the book value of the debts.
11
 This 
process involves taking absolute assignments of book debts which purport to effect a transfer 
of the debts to the finance provider. No security is taken and so there is no requirement to 
register the assignment under the Companies Act 2006.
12
  
There is no requirement for an equitable assignee to publicise the assignment at all 
and so the arrangement remains secret.
13
 If a company becomes financially distressed, an 
equitable assignee of debts simply gives notice of the assignment to the debtors, which notice 
will usually convert the equitable assignment into a legal assignment. The assignee, as 
absolute owner, then collects the outstanding debts without sharing the proceeds with other 
creditors or contributing to the professional fees incurred in the insolvency process. 
The action by the equitable assignee to convert its interest into an absolute legal 
assignment by notice to the debtor is effective as long as the assignor has not yet entered 
formal insolvency proceedings such as administration or compulsory liquidation. Once in 
administration or compulsory liquidation the respective statutory moratoria contained within 
those regimes appear to prevent the conversion of the equitable assignment into a legal 
assignment.
14
 If the equitable assignment has not yet been converted into a legal assignment, 
the assignee remains an equitable assignee. If an equitable assignment does not operate as an 
absolute transfer of ownership of the debt, the interest held by an equitable assignee is not 
                                                          
9
 Re Brumark Investments Ltd [2001] 2 AC 710 and Re Spectrum Plus Ltd [2005] 2 AC 680 overruled the 
legitimacy of the previous common practice of banks taking fixed charges over book debts. See eg A. Berg “The 
cuckoo in the nest of corporate insolvency: some aspects of the Spectrum case” [2006] Journal of Business Law 
22 and R. Gregory and P. Walton “Spectrum Plus – common law makes takeover bid for equity” [2005] 13 
Sweet and Maxwell’s Company Law Newsletter 1. 
10
 For an example where the lender was able to display sufficient control over the debts to establish a fixed 
charge see Re Harmony Care Homes Ltd [2010] BCC 358. 
11
 See the discussion in P. Walton “Fixed and Floating Charges: the Great British fund-off?” (2015) 8 Corporate 
Rescue and Insolvency 18 and (2015) 30 Butterworths Journal of International Banking and Financial Law 3. 
12
 Part 25 of the Companies Act 2006 generally requires registration of security interests over company assets. 
The U.K. has no general system of registration of interests over personal property such as that found in the U.S. 
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, versions of which have been adopted by, for example, New 
Zealand, Australia and the common law provinces of Canada. The UNCITRAL Model Law on Secured 
Transactions contains similar provisions. 
13
 For a consideration of the historical Parliamentary objections to secret devices being used to provide a 
creditor with priority in a debtor’s insolvency see P. Walton “Fixed and Floating Charges: the Great British 
fund-off?” (2015) 8 Corporate Rescue and Insolvency 18 and (2015) 30 Butterworths Journal of International 
Banking and Financial Law 3. 
14
 See respectively paras 42 and 43 of Sch B1 and s 127 of the Insolvency Act 1986. 
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that of an absolute owner of the debt. If that interest is an equitable charge (as will be argued 
below), it will fail, on the formal insolvency of the assignor, as an unregistered charge.
15
 
 
III. DEBT FACTORING AND INVOICE DISCOUNTING 
 
Commercial law developments are a response to commercial needs.
16
 Until the mid-
nineteenth century unincorporated businesses were financed by way of loans typically 
secured by bills of sale over chattels and debts. Such bills of sale were either in the form of 
absolute transfers of assets or mortgages
17
 of those assets. Borrowing on the security of bills 
of sale suffered from a number of weaknesses largely due to their being capable of being 
attacked under various statutes.
18
 It was, of course, possible to incorporate a business by 
obtaining a Royal Charter or by private Act of Parliament if the proposed undertaking was 
significant.
19
 Following the passing of the various Companies Acts
20
 in the middle part of the 
nineteenth century, registered companies, with the benefit of limited liability, became a more 
common business medium. Companies required finance and over time it became common for 
such companies to borrow on the security of a floating charge.
21
 The floating charge remains 
a cornerstone of much corporate lending today.  
It can be seen that since the late nineteenth century, financiers developed various 
practices designed to maintain maximum protection for their interests, including taking 
security over  book debts. The courts
22
 and Parliament reacted to these developments by 
trying to maintain a reasonable balance between the competing interests of those claiming an 
interest in a company’s book debts. Restrictions have been imposed to ensure that the 
interests of financiers are balanced with the interests of other stakeholders in a business, such 
as unsecured creditors.
23
  
                                                          
15
 Although it is beyond the scope of this article, its conclusions may also have an impact upon securitisations of 
debts which, if subject to English law, will often rely upon equitable assignments of the securitised debt (see eg 
A. Haynes “Companies and finance, Editorial” (2015) 36 Company Lawyer 325 and Titan Europe 2006-3 plc v 
Colliers International UK plc [2015] EWCA Civ 1083). Such assignments will potentially be void for non-
registration under the Companies Act 2006 but may fall within the concept of financial collateral in which case 
registration will not be required under the Financial Collateral Arrangements (No 2) Regulations 2003 (SI 
2003/3226) as amended. 
16
 R. Goode "The Exodus of the Floating Charge" Corporate and Commercial Law: Modern Developments (ed. 
Feldman and Meisel) (London: Lloyds of London, 1996) 193 at 193. 
17
 See eg Ex parte Games (1879) 12 Ch D 314. 
18
 Notably the various Bankruptcy Acts dating from 1623 (21 Jac I, c 19) and the Statute of Elizabeth 1570 (13 
Eliz I, c 5). Generally, if assets such as debts were left in the possession or control of an individual, any secret 
assignment of such debts was generally capable of being attacked on the grounds that creditors were misled into 
believing the individual was the beneficial owner of such debts. The appearance of unencumbered ownership of 
such debts provided a delusive credit. See eg the discussion in R. Gregory and P. Walton “Fixed Charges over 
Changing Assets - The Possession and Control Heresy” (1998) 2 Company, Financial and Insolvency Law 
Review 68. 
19
 See eg the discussions in G. Todd “Some Aspects of Joint Stock Companies, 1844-1900” (1932) 4 Economic 
History Review 46; R. Pennington “The Genesis of the Floating Charge” (1960) 23 Modern Law Review 630 
and R. Gregory and P. Walton “Fixed and Floating Charges – a Revelation” [2001] Lloyd’s Maritime and 
Commercial Law Quarterly 123. 
20
 See mainly Joint Stock Companies Act 1844 (7 & 8 Vict, c 110), Limited Liability Act 1855 (18 & 19 Vict,  c 
133), Joint Stock Companies Act 1856 (19 & 20 Vict, c 47) and Companies Act 1862 (25 & 26 Vict, c 89) 
21
 See eg R. Pennington “The Genesis of the Floating Charge” (1960) 23 Modern Law Review 630 and R. 
Gregory and P.Walton “Fixed and Floating Charges – a Revelation” [2001] Lloyd’s Maritime and Commercial 
Law Quarterly 123. 
22
See eg Re Brumark Investments Ltd [2001] 2 AC 710 and Re Spectrum Plus Ltd [2005] 2 AC 680 which 
imposed significant hurdles in the way of lenders being able effectively to take fixed charges over book debts. 
23
 A list of statutory restrictions on secured creditors’ interests would include: the Bills of Sale Act 1854 (17 & 
18 Vict, c 36) which made security bills of sale publicly registrable with the intention of preventing fraudulent 
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Attempts by those providing finance to companies to create a more effective priority 
than the one provided by a floating charge, were successful in the late part of the twentieth 
century when banks frequently benefitted from fixed charges on book debts.
24
 The twenty-
first century has seen a decline in fixed charges over book debts which have often been 
replaced by financiers requiring an assignment of book debts. 
Finance providers who take assignments of book debts usually do so in one of two, 
very similar, ways: 1) as debt factors or; 2) as invoice discounters. In outline terms, a debt 
factor will take an assignment of the company’s complete debt ledger and give notice to the 
debtors that the debts have been assigned. An invoice discounter will do essentially the same 
thing but will not provide notice to the debtors unless and until the company becomes 
insolvent (or some other significant occurrence happens).
25
  
Until the Judicature Act 1873, debts (and, generally, other choses in action) could 
only be assigned in equity. Section 25(6) of the Judicature Act 1873 (now found in 
substantially the same form in s 136 of the Law of Property Act 1925) permitted, for the first 
time, legal assignments. Prior to 1873, an assignee could only enforce an equitable 
assignment in the common law courts with the co-operation of the assignor or the assistance 
of a court of equity which would order that an action could be brought on the debt in the 
common law courts in the name of the assignor.
26
 The Judicature Act 1873 changed this by 
permitting a legal assignment of a chose in action which, if effective, transfers all the legal 
rights in the chose in action to the assignee who can enforce the chose in action in his or her 
own name. Under s 136, a legal assignment must be in writing, must be absolute (whether by 
way of outright transfer or transfer by way of mortgage but not by way of charge) and notice 
in writing must be given to the debtor. 
Debt factors and invoice discounters (which are both types of what are commonly 
called receivables financiers) rely upon legal assignments under s.136 to prove absolute 
ownership of their respective assigned debts. Until such time that notice is given to the debtor 
of the assigned debt, an invoice discounter has the benefit only of an equitable assignment. 
By giving notice some time after taking the assignment, the invoice discounter converts the 
equitable assignment into a legal assignment. 
The Asset Based Finance Association (“ABFA”), which was integrated into UK 
Finance in 2017, was previously the separate trade association for companies offering 
receivables finance in the U.K. and Ireland. ABFA’s web presence remains extant at the time 
of writing. It explains how invoice discounting operates:  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
secret bills; the Bankruptcy Act 1914 (4 & 5 Geo 5, c 59) which made a general assignment by an individual (or 
partnership) of present or future book debts subject to registration under the Bills of Sale Act 1878 (41 & 42 
Vict, c 31) (this provision lives on in s 344 Insolvency Act 1986); the Companies Act 1900 (63 & 64 Vict, c 48) 
(which introduced the requirement for, inter alia, floating charges over a company’s assets to be registered 
publicly; the Companies Act 1907 (7 Edw 7, c 50) extended public registration to charges over a company’s 
book debts. For the modern law on registration of company charges see Part 25 Companies Act 2006 (2006 c 
46) which requires registration of all company charges subject to some exclusions; see also the prescribed part 
deduction from floating charge assets in favour of unsecured creditors found in s 176A Insolvency Act 1986 
(1986 c 45) introduced by s 252 Enterprise Act 2002 (2002 c 40). 
24
 Siebe Gorman & Co Ltd v Barclays Bank Ltd [1979] 2 Ll Rep 142 was relied upon for over twenty years by 
banks claiming their purported fixed charges on book debts were valid. Siebe Gorman was eventually overruled 
by the House of Lords in Re Spectrum Plus Ltd [2005] 2 AC 680. 
25
 See eg Chapters 2 and 3 of F.R. Salinger Tolly’s Factoring A guide to factoring practice and law (Croydon: 
Tolley, 1984). 
26
 See eg Cator v Croydon Canal Company (1843) 4 Y & C 405; 160 ER 1149. The procedure since 1873 is 
simplified as the administration of the common law and equity is now conducted by a single court which can 
deal with an action where the debt has been assigned in equity as long as the assignor, assignee and debtor are 
before the court (Holt v Heatherfield Trust Ltd [1942] 2 KB 1). 
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“Immediate cash is available up to 80/85% of approved invoices. However, responsibility for 
the sales ledger operation remains with you, and the service is normally undisclosed to 
customers. Payments that you receive are paid into a bank account administered by the 
Invoice Discounter, after which you are credited with the balance, less charges.”27  
The fees deducted by the financier typically comprise an administration charge 
(which may be a flat monthly fee or a percentage of turnover) and a discount charge which 
“is likely to be comparable with normal secured bank overdraft rates.”28 Once the financier 
has deducted its charges the debt is released back to the company. This type of finance is 
increasingly popular in the Small and Medium Enterprise market and assists many companies 
which would otherwise experience severe cash flow problems whilst awaiting payment of 
outstanding invoices.
29
 Receivables financing is on the increase. Data collated by the 
European Union Federation for the Factoring and Commercial Finance Industry shows that 
factoring and commercial finance volumes in the EU grew overall in 2017 by 7.5% to €1.6 
Trillion with the UK’s turnover being the largest in the EU.30 The statistics prepared by UK 
Finance suggest that over 90% of receivables financing is done by way of invoice discounting 
rather than debt factoring.
31
 
Although at first blush the activities of receivables financiers appear to have all the 
characteristics of a security interest, the Court of Appeal has held in Welsh Development 
Agency v Export Finance Co Ltd,
32
 that such matters as the company retaining a right of 
redemption, by repaying the advance made by the financier along with its fees, are not 
necessarily inconsistent with an outright transfer of the debts. Consequently, the accepted 
wisdom is that a debt factoring or invoice discounting agreement is a transfer of property not 
a security interest requiring registration as such under the Companies Act 2006.  
It will be suggested below that this accepted wisdom does not fully appreciate the 
difference between an equitable assignment of a legal chose in action and a legal assignment 
of such a chose in action. Cases such as Welsh Development Agency may be correctly 
decided on the basis that a legal assignment of a chose in action (such as a book debt) may be 
seen as an absolute transfer rather than a transfer by way of mortgage and so not registrable 
under the Companies Act 2006. This does not impact upon the suggestion that an equitable 
assignment of a legal chose in action, without more, transfers no property to the assignee but, 
in itself creates only an equitable charge over the chose in action. 
 
IV. NATURE OF EQUITABLE ASSIGNMENTS OF CHOSES IN ACTION 
 
In equity an assignment need not be in writing or communicated to the debtor for it to be 
enforced.
33
 The debtor need not consent to the assignment for it to be effective
34
 and will be 
liable to the assignee if the debtor is given notice of the assignment but proceeds to pay the 
                                                          
27
 http://www.abfa.org.uk/About/invoiceDiscounting.asp (last accessed on 11th June 2018). 
28
 Ibid. 
29
 http://www.abfa.org.uk/About/Documents/2016_ABFA_A5-Booklet_web.pdf (last accessed on 11th June 
2018). See also H. Beale, L. Gullifer and S. Paterson “A case for interfering with freedom of contract? An 
empirically-informed study of bans on assignment” [2016] Journal of Business Law 203. 
30
 https://euf.eu.com/ (last accessed on 11
th
 June 2018). 
31
 https://www.ukfinance.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/UK-FINANCE-Asset-based-finance-statisticsQ4-
2017.pdf (last accessed on 11th June 2018). 
32
 [1992] BCC 270. 
33
 See eg Walker v Bradford Old Bank (1884) 12 QBD 511 at 517; Re General Horticultural Co (1886) 32 Ch D 
512 at 515; Gorringe v Irwell India Rubber and Gutta Percha Works (1886) 34 Ch D 128 at 132; William 
Brandt’s Sons & Co v Dunlop Rubber Co Ltd [1905] AC 454 at 462 and Holt v Heatherfield Trust Ltd [1942] 2 
KB 1 at 5. 
34
 Bell v London and North-Western Railway Co (1852) 15 Beav. 548; 51 ER 651. 
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assignor.
35
 Notice to the debtor need not be given of the assignment for an assignment to be 
effective in equity.
36
 The danger faced by an assignee in equity, if no notice is given to the 
debtor, is that the assignment may lose priority to, for example, a subsequent assignee.
37
  
Procedurally, prior to the Judicature Act 1873, an equitable assignee needed to file a 
bill in equity to obtain an injunction in personam against an assignor who was unwilling to 
lend his or her name voluntarily to the proceeding to allow the assignee to use the assignor’s 
name at law (subject to a suitable indemnity to protect the assignor in costs).
38
 The modern 
conventional view is that the requirement for the legal owner to be joined is merely 
procedural rather than substantive and subject to various safeguards the requirement for the 
legal owner to be joined may be dispensed with.
39
 
 
(a) Equitable assignments do not transfer any rights 
 
Edelman and Elliott
40
 convincingly explain the principal characteristics of an equitable 
assignment. Although the word “assignment” itself suggests a transfer of rights, the learned 
authors explain that the often accepted wisdom which characterises an equitable assignment 
as involving a transfer of rights is mistaken.  
The learned authors explain that an equitable assignment cannot involve any transfer 
of any right, legal or equitable. The reason why s 25(6) of the Judicature Act 1873 was 
passed was because in equity the assignor needed to be a party to any suit to enforce the 
chose in action. The reason why the assignor needed to be a party to the suit was because the 
legal right being assigned had not been transferred to the assignee. The learned authors 
explain that it ought still to be necessary, in order for an equitable assignee to enforce an 
equitable assignment, for the enforcement to be done in the name of the assignor. The 
assignor remains the legal owner of the chose in action. The weight of authority supporting 
this view is convincing.
41
 Legal title to the chose in action remains with the assignor and is 
held for the benefit of the assignee.  
Neither is it possible to argue that the equitable assignor is transferring merely an 
equitable right in a debt. Prior to an equitable assignment of a legal chose in action the 
                                                          
35
 See eg M’Gowan v Smith (1857) 26 LJ Ch 8. 
36
 William Brandt’s Sons & Co v Dunlop Rubber Co Ltd [1905] AC 454 at 462. 
37
 See eg Gorringe v Irwell India Rubber and Gutta Percha Works (1886) 34 Ch D 128 at 135 and Holt v 
Heatherfield Trust Ltd [1942] 2 KB 1 at 6. Under bankruptcy law prior to the Insolvency Act 1986, assignments 
of debts were also capable of falling foul of the bankruptcy “order and disposition” clause which dated from s 
11 Bankruptcy Act 1623 (21 Jac I, c 19). They were equally capable of being attacked under the fraudulent 
conveyance provisions of the Statute of Elizabeth 1570 (13 Eliz I, c 5), the preamble to which explains it was 
intended to invalidate transfers of property made for the “Purpose and Intent, to delay, hinder or defraud 
Creditors and others of their just and lawful Actions, Suits, Debts”. See generally Ryall v Rowles (1749-50) 1 
Ves  Sen 348; 27 ER 1074. 
38
 See eg Turquand and the Capital and Counties Bank v Fearon (1879) 4 QBD 280; Torkington v Magee 
[1902] 2 KB 427 at 432; Re Westerton [1919] 2 Ch 104 at 113 and Holt v Heatherfield Trust Ltd [1942] 2 KB 1 
at 3. 
39
 See eg Central Insurance Co Ltd v Seacalf Shipping Corp (The Aiolos) [1983] 2 Ll Rep 25; Three Rivers 
District Council v Bank of England [1996] QB 292 and Kapoor v National Westminster Bank plc [2011] EWCA 
Civ 1083. If there is generally no need to join the legal owner to such an action, the result would appear to be 
that there is no difference between an equitable and legal assignment. For a discussion of joinder in this context 
see G.J. Tolhurst “Equitable assignment of legal rights: a resolution to a conundrum” (2002) 118 Law Quarterly 
Review 98.  
40
 J. Edelman and S. Elliott “Two conceptions of equitable assignment” (2015) 131 Law Quarterly Review 228. 
41
 See eg Walker v Bradford Old Bank (1884) 12 QBD 511; Torkington v Magee [1902] 2 KB 427; Re 
Westerton [1919] 2 Ch 104 and Holt v Heatherfield Trust Ltd [1942] 2 KB 1. 
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assignor has no equitable rights to transfer. As the House of Lords has previously held,
42
 
equitable rights do not co-exist with the legal rights of a person who is absolutely entitled. 
Edelman and Elliott go on to explain: 
“[An] equitable assignment is not a transfer of rights but it is a creation of new rights or 
powers of the assignee in equity which encumber the existing rights held by the assignor. The 
assignor holds their rights subject to that equitable encumbrance which generally includes a 
requirement that the assignor hold the rights for the benefit of the assignee. Many people 
would describe, and have described, this institution of holding rights for the benefit of another 
as a trust. For the purposes of this article it does not matter whether the legal institution is 
described as ‘rights held in equity for the benefit of another’ or as a ‘trust’ although for 
convenience we will use the language of trust.”
43
 
Two significant points may be concluded from Edelman and Elliott. First, an 
equitable assignment does not cause an absolute transfer of rights in the way a legal 
assignment does. Secondly, the assignor retains the legal title to the assets assigned and holds 
the rights subject to an equitable encumbrance in favour of another. An analysis of the exact 
nature of this mode of holding the legal title on behalf of another was not necessary for the 
purpose of their thesis but an examination of the exact nature of that “legal institution” is 
crucial for the purposes of this article.  
 
(b) Equitable assignments create a trust in the form of an equitable charge 
 
Although the exact juridical nature of a trust is not free from doubt,
44
 the definition suggested 
by Hart appears wide enough to include an equitable charge: “A trust is an obligation 
imposed either expressly or by implication of law whereby the obligor is bound to deal with 
property over which he has control for the benefit of certain persons of whom he may himself 
be one, and any one of whom may enforce the obligation.”45  
The characteristics of an equitable charge appear to be entirely consistent with this 
description. According to Millett LJ  (as he then was) it is the essence of an equitable charge 
“that a particular asset … is appropriated to the satisfaction of a debt … so that the chargee is 
entitled to look to the asset and its proceeds for the discharge of the liability.”46Lord Hoffman 
has commented that a “charge is a security interest created without any transfer of title or 
possession to the beneficiary.”47 To similar effect, Peter Gibson J explained that a “charge is 
created by an appropriation of specific property to the discharge of some debt or other 
obligation without there being any change in ownership either at law or in equity, and it 
confers on the chargee rights to apply to the court for an order for sale or for the appointment 
of a receiver….”48 
From these statements, it is clear that a chargee has a right to have assets realised even 
though no title or possession of the asset charged has been transferred to the chargee. The 
chargor remains the legal owner of the asset and the chargee is the beneficiary in equity. An 
equitable charge imposes an obligation on a person (the chargor) which restricts how he or 
she may deal with property over which he or she has control in favour of another (the 
chargee). The chargee may enforce the obligation. The chargor holds the charged assets on 
trust for the chargee. 
                                                          
42
 Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington LBC [1996] AC 669 at 706 per Lord Browne-Wilkinson. 
43
 J. Edelman and S. Elliott “Two conceptions of equitable assignment” (2015) 131 Law Quarterly Review 228 
at 231-235.  
44
 See eg the recent discussion by Lord Mance in Akers v Samba Financial Group [2017] AC 424 at [15]. 
45
 W.G. Hart “What is a trust?” (1899) 15 Law Quarterly Review 294 at 301. 
46
 Re Cosslett (Contractors) Ltd [1998] Ch 495 at 508. 
47
 Re Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA (No 8) [1998] AC 214 at 226. 
48
 Carreras Rothmans Ltd v Freeman Mathews Treasure Ltd [1985] Ch 207 at 227. 
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Additionally, Lord Browne-Wilkinson has made the following observations about a trust: 
“Once a trust is established, as from the date of its establishment the beneficiary has, in 
equity, a proprietary interest in the trust property, which proprietary interest will be 
enforceable in equity against any subsequent holder of the property … other than a purchaser 
for value of the legal interest without notice.”49  
Again, this description is consistent with the suggestion that an equitable charge is a 
form of trust. In the same way as a trust operates, an equitable charge will not bind a 
purchaser for value of the legal interest without notice.
50
  
The proposition that a chargor holds assets on trust for the chargee is an established 
explanation as to how an equitable charge operates: “a person may create an effective 
equitable charge over chattels by declaring that he holds them in trust for a creditor by way of 
security for the payment of a specified debt.”51 Although this statement referred specifically 
to chattels rather than choses in action this does not affect the general application of the 
principle.  
In order to isolate further the nature of an equitable assignment it is proposed to 
consider various authorities from around the time of the Judicature Act 1873. As will be seen 
in the remainder of this part and the next part, a consideration of nineteenth century 
textbooks, pre-1873 case law and the wording of the Judicature Act 1873 itself, suggest that 
the equitable interest created in favour of the equitable assignee is an equitable charge.  
 
(c) Commentary and case law prior to the Judicature Act 1873 
 
A leading textbook from 1866 by Joseph Story, Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence as 
administered in England and America
52
  gives the following example:  
“[I]f A, having a debt due to him from B, should order it to be paid to C, the order would 
amount in equity to an assignment of the debt, and would be enforced in equity, although the 
debtor had not assented thereto. The same principle would apply to the case of an assignment 
of a part of such debt. In each case, a trust would be created in favour of the equitable 
assignee on the fund, and would constitute an equitable lien upon it.”53 
It should be pointed out that in this context the use of the word “lien” is “popular and 
not technical. It properly applies only in respect of goods in the possession of a bailee – not in 
respect of a mere chose in action such as a debt.”54 Despite this rather non-technical use of 
the term the concept of a security interest over a chose in action was often referred to as a 
“lien” in the nineteenth century, both by the courts55 and by Parliament.56 A lien at common 
law requires possession to be taken.
57
 Equitable liens do not require possession to be taken 
and it has been recognised judicially that the term “lien” is sometimes used to describe what 
                                                          
49
 Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington London Borough Council [1996] AC 669 at 705F. 
50
 See eg Hudston v Viney [1921] 1 Ch 98. 
51
 Re Bond Worth Ltd [1980] Ch 228 at 250. 
52
 Joseph Story, Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence as administered in England and America (9
th
 Ed Vol 2 
Boston: Little, Brown and Co, 1866) at para 1044. 
53
 See to the same effect (and citing Story), Wardlow Taylor Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence Founded 
on Story (Toronto: Willing and Williamson, 1875) at 367-8. 
54
 James Stephen The Common Law Procedure Act 1860 with Practical Notes (London: Butterworths, 1860) at 
p. 66. This observation was made in the commentary to s 29 of the 1860 Act which gave a discretion to the 
courts not to make a garnishee order over a debt under s 61 Common Law Procedure Act 1854 if some third 
person had “a lien or charge upon it.” 
55
 See eg Barker v St Quintin (1844) 12 M & W 44; 152 ER 1270 where the labelling of an attorney’s “lien” 
over a judgment was described as “… perhaps an incorrect expression” and would be better seen as “merely a 
claim to the equitable interference of the Court to have that judgment held as security for his debt” per Parke B. 
at 451, 1274. See also Hough v Edwards (1856) 26 LJ Ex 55 approving this statement.  
56
 See eg s 29 Common Law Procedure Act 1860. 
57
 See eg Gladstone v Birley (1818) 2 Mer 401; 35 ER 993. 
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is in fact an equitable charge.
58
 In this context the term “lien” equates to “charge” as an 
interest creating a security interest over the debt assigned without legal title or possession 
passing to the equitable assignee. Story does not distinguish between equitable assignments 
of the whole of a debt and part of a debt. Both create an equitable charge in favour of the 
assignee. 
In Ex parte South
59
 a trader gave an order to one of his creditors, with notice to the 
debtor’s executors, for the executors to pay the creditor the debt owed once the debtor’s 
executors had sufficient funds to pay it. The assignment was in the following terms: “Please 
pay [the creditor] … £417, 6s as part of the amount due to me for plumber’s work done for 
the late John Fish esq.” The trader was subsequently made bankrupt. The bankrupt’s estate 
could not claim the proceeds of the debt which were payable to the creditor. Lord Eldon 
explained that the “draft was given as a security; the executor retained it in his hands as a 
charge on the assets”.60  
In Diplock v Hammond
61
 there were references by counsel in argument to an equitable 
assignment of the debt in question being a “lien” upon the money due by the debtor. On the 
facts, there had been an attempt by the assignor to repudiate the first assignment and to assign 
to another (after notice had already been given to the debtor). In his judgment, Sir John Stuart 
VC refers to the first assignment as being an equitable assignment with notice, the effect of 
which was to give the first assignee priority over the “security”62 held by the second 
assignee.
63
 On appeal Knight-Bruce LJ (with whom Turner LJ agreed) upheld the decision 
and referred to the effect of the first assignment as “giving him a preferable lien” to that of 
the second assignee.
64
  
A case where judges referred to the effect of an equitable assignment as creating a 
lien and a trust is Collyer v Fallon.
65
 Sir Thomas Plumer MR (who died after judgment but 
before subsequent proceedings in the same case before the new Master of the Rolls) 
explained that an equitable assignment was an “order to pay … an appropriation of the 
money … an assignment … of a chose in action: it created lien, and those, in whose favour it 
was given, got hold of the fund.”66 His Lordship’s successor, Lord Gifford MR commented: 
“The moment, therefore, that the memorandum, directing them to retain a sum ... for the 
benefit of particular persons, was communicated to them, they became trustees of so much of 
the fund for the use of the persons thus specified.”67  
                                                          
58
 See eg Slade J in Re Bond Worth Ltd [1980] Ch 228 at 250: “I have used the phrase ‘charge’ rather than the 
word ‘lien,’ because, though the word ‘lien’ is sometimes used in practice to describe a right which arises by 
way of express contractual agreement of the interested parties, it is more commonly used, in a narrower sense, to 
refer to a right arising by operation of law.”  
59
 (1818) 3 Swanst 393; 36 ER 907. 
60
 (1818) 3 Swanst 393 at 394; 36 ER 907 at 908. This case was an appeal from Ex Parte Alderson (1815) 1 
Mad 53; 56 ER 21 where the draft had originally been held to be a valid equitable assignment. It was there 
stated that without the complication of the bankruptcy the creditors might “by a bill in equity, have obtained the 
benefit of the assignment” (at 55; 22) per Sir Thomas Plumer VC. The relevance of this is that assignees could 
only enforce their rights by bringing an action in a court in equity.  
61
 (1854) 2 Sm & Giff 141, 65 ER 339 affirmed on appeal at (1854) 5 DeGM & G 320, 43 ER 893. 
62
 (1854) 2 Sm & Giff 141, 65 ER 339 at 146, 341. 
63
 See also Meux v Bell (1841) 1 Hare 73 at 85; 65 ER 955 at 960 where Sir James Wigram VC commented: “In 
the absence of notice the party claiming the prior incumbrance has not perfected his title … if he fails to do this, 
and another person takes an incumbrance, and gives notice, the second person has acquired a perfect 
assignment, whilst the first equitable assignment is imperfect.” The point to note here is his Lordship’s use of 
“incumbrance” and “assignment” as being interchangeable. The suggestion is that an assignment creates an 
incumbrance on property rather than a transfer of property. 
64
 (1854) 5 DeGM & G 320 at 322; 43 ER 893 at 894. 
65
  (1823) Turn & R 459; 37 ER 1177. 
66
  (1823) Turn & R 459 at 470; 37 ER 1177 at 1181. 
67
 (1823) Turn & R 459 at 476; 37 ER 1177 at 1183. 
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Although the terminology is not entirely consistent it would appear from these cases 
(and others
68
) that the effect of an equitable assignment of a chose in action is to create an 
equitable interest in the debt in favour of the assignee. The assignment does not operate as an 
absolute transfer of the chose in action but rather as an appropriation in favour of the 
assignee.
69
 This interest is a security interest whereby the debtor holds the debt on trust 
subject to the charge in favour of the assignee. An equitable assignment can be seen as 
equating to what modern equity judges call an equitable charge. The assignee has a right to 
have assets realised even though no title or possession of the asset has been transferred to the 
assignee. The assignor remains the legal owner of the asset and the assignee is the beneficiary 
in equity.    
 
V. JUDICATURE ACT 1873  
 
(a) The problem created by dual systems of law – the road to resolution 
 
The different laws and remedies applied by, respectively the Court of Chancery and the 
common law courts, were recognised as a major problem in terms of the administration of 
justice throughout the first three-quarters of the nineteenth century. A great many Royal 
Commission reports
70
 were produced in this period which wrestled with the problem of how 
                                                          
68
 Reference may also be made to eg Adams v Claxton (1801) 6 Ves Jun 226; 31 ER 1024 where Grant MR was 
looking for evidence of an “appropriation” of the chose in action - “an assignment: a lien, giving that creditor a 
right to a specific application in his favour” (at 230; 1026). In a further report of the case at 1 Ves  Jun Supp 590 
at 591; 34 ER 935 at 935, it is stated in the context of an assignment that: “where personalty is so ‘ear-marked’ 
as to be capable of being clearly distinguished, Courts of Equity will be disposed to consider it as appropriated 
in favour of cestuis que trust.” In Row v Dawson (1749) 1 Ves Sen 331; 27 ER 1064 there is a reference to the 
effect of an assignment of a chose in action as being “a credit on this fund” (at 332; 1064) per the Lord 
Chancellor, Lord Hardwicke. There is also reference to the assignment providing a “specific lien” on the fund 
(at 331; 1064). The assignment of a debt in Smith v Everett (1792) 4 Bro CC 64; 29 ER 780 was described by 
Lord Commissioner Eyre as one where “there could not be a stronger appropriation of the fund” and the court 
“declared that the assignees had a specific lien on the monies” (at 67; 782). In Watson v Duke of Wellington 
(1830) 1 Russ & M 602; 39 ER 231, counsel referred in argument to the letter in question creating “an equitable 
charge” (at 603; 232) and (even without the letter), counsel argued the circumstances would be sufficient “to 
create a charge on the fund” as “writing is not necessary to create a trust of personal property” (at 604; 232). Sir 
John Leach MR (at 605; 232) stated: “In order to constitute an equitable assignment, there must be an 
engagement to pay out of the particular fund.” In Hirsch v Coates (1856) 25 LJ CP 315 it was explained that a 
garnishee could not attach a debt which had previously been assigned in equity (“If the debtor has charged or 
parted with his interest in the debt, then except as to any excess beyond the amount of the charge, no interest 
will to the person obtaining the order” per Jervis CJ at 317).  
69
 See eg Crowfoot v Gurney (1832) 9 Bing 372; 131 ER 655 – the effect of an equitable assignment was such 
that the assignee “might have gone into a court of equity to compel a formal assignment” per Tindal CJ at 375; 
656.  
70
 See eg the Commission to inquire into the Practice of Chancery (28
th
 February 1826 (HC 143 (1826) xv, xvi); 
the first Commission to inquire into the Practice and Procedure of the Superior Courts of Common Law at 
Westminster which issued three reports (18
th
 February 1829, HC 26 (1829) ix; 26
th
 February 1830 HC 123 
(1830) xi, 547; and 6
th
 July 1831, HC 92 (1831) x, 375); the second Commission to inquire into Process, 
Practice and System of Pleading in the Superior Courts of Common Law at Westminster which issued three 
reports (30
th
 June 1851 [1389] HC (1851) xxii, 567, 30
th
 April 1853 [1626] HC (1852-3) xl, 701 and 20
th
 
February 1860 [2614] HC (1860) xxxi, 341; the Commission to inquire into the Process, Practice and System of 
Pleading in the Court of Chancery which produced three reports (27
th
 January 1852 [1437, 1454] HC (1852) 
xxi, 1, 333, 11
th
 January 1854 [1731] HC (1854) xxiv, 1, 14
th
 April 1856 [2064] HC (1856) xxii, 1); the 
Commission to inquire into the Mode of Taking Evidence in Chancery and its Effects (18
th
 August 1859, [2698] 
HC (1860) xxxi, 279);  and most famously the Judicature Commission which issued five reports (25
th
  March 
1869 [4130] HC (1868-9) xxv, 1, 3
rd
  July 1872 [C 631 and C 631-1] HC (1872) xx, 217, 245, 21
st
 January 1874 
[C 957 and C 957-1] HC (1874) xxiv, 1, 13, 25
th
 March 1874, [C 984 and C 984-1] HC (1874) xxiv, 183, 191, 
10
th
 July 1874 [C 1090] HC (1874) xxiv, 307. 
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best to unify the administration of justice. Common law courts were provided with some 
powers equivalent to those of the Court of Chancery, such as the power to issue injunctions 
and to order specific performance.
71
 To similar effect the Court of Chancery was permitted to 
exercise certain common law powers such as awarding damages.
72
 Two distinct legislative 
approaches might be identified from this period. One approach was what might today be 
called the “Big Bang” approach which considered uniting all the laws and courts into a 
unitary system of justice. The other approach, which might be labelled a “piecemeal” 
approach was to pick off various specific issues where a conflict arose between the common 
law and equity and to legislate only for those specific circumstances. 
An example of the “Big Bang” approach was the High Court of Justice Bill 1870 
which ultimately failed to pass. Clause 9 of the Bill explicitly provided that “Equity, or the 
rules and principles which govern the Court of Chancery in the administration of justice, shall 
henceforth be blended and united with the common law of England, and (so far as there is 
any difference) shall control and modify the same and supply the defects thereof… .” This 
proposed solution did not look at individual instances where the common law and equity 
conflicted or where one was deficient in some regard but instead looked to a general 
unification of both systems with equity prevailing where a conflict did exist. 
There were a number of specific problem areas of law identified which showed that 
the common law and equity were in conflict. One of these areas, which became subject to the 
“piecemeal” approach was the law on the assignments of choses in action. Until 1873, choses 
in action were not generally assignable at law.
73
 Throughout the nineteenth century various 
statutes specifically made certain choses in action capable of assignment at law.
74
 These 
specific instances of legal assignments were not free from difficulty. For example, it was 
recognised that the wording of the Policies of Assurance Act 1867,
75
 which permitted an 
absolute assignment of a life assurance policy, might not include a mortgage of such a 
policy.
76
  
The Judicature Commission, which inquired into the law and arrangements for 
distributing and transacting judicial business in the superior courts of common law and 
equity, produced five reports.
77
 Their work was eventually given effect by the Judicature Acts 
1873 and 1875.
78
 The approach of the Judicature Act 1873 to the different systems of law 
was part “Big Bang” and part “piecemeal”. Section 25 listed 10 specific examples where the 
                                                          
71
 See eg the Common Law Procedure Acts 1852 (15 & 16 Vict, c 76), 1854 (17 & 18 Vict, c 15) and 1860 (23 
& 24 Vict, c 126). 
72
 Chancery Amendment Act 1858 (21 & 22 Vict, c 27), known as Lord Cairns’ Act, for a discussion of which 
see eg J. Jolowicz “Damages in Equity: A Study of Lord Cairns’ Act” (1975) 34 Cambridge Law Journal 224. 
73
 If not capable of being assigned under a particular statute, a gift of a legal chose in action could only be made 
at law in the form of a power of attorney providing authority to the donee to use the donor’s name in claiming 
for his own benefit the chose in action - see eg Winch v Keeley (1787) 1 TR 619, 99 ER 1284, Gerard v Lewis 
(1866-7) LR 2 CP 305. 
74
 See eg for bills of exchange, cheques and promissory notes the Bills of Exchange Act 1882 (45 & 46 Vict, c 
61), ss  31, 38, 73, 83 and 84; for indorsed bills of lading the Bills of Lading Act 1855 (18 & 19 Vict, c 111, s1); 
for life assurance policies the Policies of Life Assurance Act 1867 (30 & 31 Vict, c 144); for marine assurance 
policies the Marine Insurance Act 1868 (31 & 32 Vict, c 86); for railway bonds (8 Vict, c 16, s 46); for East 
India bonds the East India Company Bonds Act 1811 (51 Geo III, c 64, s 4). 
75
 30 & 31 Vict, c 144. 
76
 See the discussion of this problem in “The Policies of Assurance Act 1867” (1867) 14(1) Journal of the 
Institute of Actuaries and Assurance Magazine 46 at 47. 
77
 The Judicature Commission’s five reports were produced between 1869 and 1874: 25 th  March 1869 [4130] 
HC (1868-9) xxv, 1, 3
rd
  July 1872 [C 631 and C 631-1] HC (1872) xx, 217, 245, 21
st
 January 1874 [C 957 and 
C 957-1] HC (1874) xxiv, 1, 13, 25
th
 March 1874, [C 984 and C984-1] HC (1874) xxiv, 183, 191, 10
th
 July 1874 
[C 1090] HC (1874) xxiv, 307. 
78
 Respectively the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1873 (36 & 37 Vict, c 66) and the Supreme Court of 
Judicature Act 1875 (38 & 39 Vict, c 77). 
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law and equity
79
 were inconsistent and provided a solution to those inconsistencies. It also 
contained a general default rule in s 25(11) whereby if, in any other cases, the common law 
and equity conflicted, the rule in equity would prevail. 
 
(b) Legal assignments become possible 
 
Section 25(6) of the Judicature Act 1873 introduced into law a power generally to assign 
legal choses in action. This provision is effectively unchanged in the current s 136 of the Law 
of Property Act 1925. The wording of the provision appears to have passed through 
Parliament unamended without comment. For present purposes it is important to note that it 
allows a legal assignment of a legal chose in action if the assignment is in writing and if 
written notice is given to the debtor of the assignment. Once notice is given, the assignment is 
effective to “pass and transfer the legal right” to the chose in action, subject to equities, along 
with “all legal rights and other remedies”. The wording of the subsection does contain a 
conundrum. It applies to an “absolute assignment … (not purporting to be by way of charge 
only)”. Subsequent case law has often struggled fully to explain what these words in 
parenthesis mean.
80
 
The subsection operates to place the assignee into exactly the same position as the 
assignor was previously. The assignee is the legal owner of the chose in action and can sue in 
his or her own name to enforce the chose in action. He or she is the legal owner.
81
 The chose 
in action has been fully transferred (subject to equities). A legal assignment under this 
provision operates by way of transfer of title to the chose in action.
82
  
The problem created by its wording is the qualification : “(not purporting to be by 
way of charge only)”. If it is argued that all assignments of a chose in action involve a 
transfer of title to the assignee, this phrase appears to be misconceived or at best unnecessary 
in its context. A charge does not involve a transfer of title
83
 and so it would seem unnecessary 
to state explicitly that an assignment under this subsection could ever purport to be by way of 
charge. Only if an assignment is capable of being a charge would this phrase be a sensible 
addition. 
 
(c) Equitable assignments “purporting to be by way of charge only” 
 
One possible solution to the conundrum created by the wording of s 25(6), which the court 
suggested in National Provincial Bank of England v Harle,
84
 was subsequently overruled. It 
had been suggested in Harle that if an assignment was by way of mortgage, that is, the 
assignment was not an out-and-out transfer or sale but was limited in value to the secured 
debt, the assignment was not absolute but was by way of charge only. Subsequently the court 
                                                          
79
 Or the law of admiralty – see s 25(9). 
80
 See the discussion below at V (c). 
81
 The subsection is often said to be procedural only in that it permits the assignee to sue at common law in his 
or her own name without the need to include the assignor, which was and arguably remains, a requirement when 
enforcing equitable assignments (see eg J. Edelman and S. Elliott “Two conceptions of equitable assignment” 
(2015) 131 Law Quarterly Review 228; Read v Brown (1888) 22 QBD 128; Tolhurst v Associated Portland 
Cement Manufacturing Co Ltd [1902] 2 KB 660 and Bennett v White [1910] 2 KB 643). 
82
 It permits an assignment of any chose in action which is capable of assignment in equity and so covers, for 
example, future choses in action as well as those presently enforceable (Brice v Bannister (1878) 3 QBD 569). 
83
 See eg Burlinson v Hall (1884) 12 QBD 347 per Day J at 350; Re Cosslett Contractors Lt [1998] Ch 495 
508F-G per Millett LJ and Re Bank of Credit and Commerce International S.A. [1998] AC 214 at 226 per Lord 
Hoffman. 
84
 (1881) LR 6 Ex D 626. 
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in Burlinson v Hall
85
 pointed out that the decision in Harle confuses the meaning of the terms 
mortgage and charge. The meaning of the word “absolute” in the subsection is to be 
contradistinguished from a “conditional” assignment not from a sale. An assignment which 
was by mortgage was still absolute as long as the title vesting in the mortgagee vested “there 
and then.”86 The assignment of the chose in action transferred the chose in action to the 
mortgagee who could realise it in his own name. Just because the mortgagor could redeem 
the mortgage and demand a re-conveyance of the chose in action did not prevent the 
assignment to the mortgagee being absolute in character. The court pointed out that the 
assignment was not a charge which “differs altogether from a mortgage. By a charge the title 
is not transferred, but instead the person creating the charge merely says that out of a 
particular fund he will discharge a particular debt.”87 In Tancred v Delagoa Bay and East 
Africa Railway Co,
88
 the Divisional Court approved the decision in Burlinson effectively 
overruling Harle. 
The reference to an assignment which purports to be a “charge” appears to be 
incongruous in the context of legal assignments, which by definition always involve a 
transfer of title and are therefore either out-and-out transfers or transfers by way of mortgage. 
They can never be charges. Although the Judicature Act 1873 introduced the possibility of a 
legal assignment of a legal chose in action it did not outlaw equitable assignments.  
As suggested above, the effect of an equitable assignment was to create a charge over 
the chose in action. The wording of s 25(6) is readily comprehensible in light of this. If the 
assignment is by way of charge only it will still be operative but will operate outside s 25(6). 
If it fails to satisfy the requirements of the subsection, for example, because notice is not 
provided to the debtor, it will not be a legal assignment but will qualify only as an equitable 
assignment, and by definition purport to be by way of charge only. As was stated in Durham 
Brothers v Robertson
89
 by Chitty LJ: “It is plain that every equitable assignment in the wide 
sense of the term as used in equity is not within [s 25(6)].”90 
It is also tolerably clear that subsequent to the Judicature Act 1873, the courts 
continued to recognise an equitable assignment as creating a charge over the debt assigned in 
equity. The discussion, and terminology used by the Court of Appeal, in Gorringe v Irwell 
India Rubber and Gutta Percha Works
91
 is entirely supportive of this view. Cotton LJ stated: 
“When there is a contract for value between the owner of a chose in action and another 
person which shews that such person is to have the benefit of the chose in action, that 
constitutes a good charge on the chose in action.”92 Fry LJ commented on the charge 
document in question: “First, it is said that it created no charge at all. I think that it did. It 
made the writer of the instrument a trustee of the debt for the Appellants, and therefore it is 
equivalent to an equitable assignment.”93 
The overwhelming volume of case law suggests that an equitable assignment of a debt 
creates a charge over the debt which the assignor holds on trust for the assignee. Equitable 
assignments are by way of charge only and therefore outside the statutory assignment 
machinery. The wording of the Judicature Act 1873 supports the argument that an equitable 
assignment operates by way of charge. 
 
                                                          
85
 (1884) 12 QBD 347. 
86
(1884) 12 QBD 347 per Day J at 350. 
87
 (1884) 12 QBD 347 per Day J at 350.  
88
 (1889) 23 QBD 239. 
89
 [1898] 1 QB 765. 
90
 [1898] 1 QB 765 at 771. 
91
 (1886) 34 Ch D 128. 
92
 (1886) 34 Ch D 128 at 134. 
93
 (1886) 34 Ch D 128 at 136. 
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VI. WHAT TYPE OF EQUITABLE CHARGE IS CREATED BY AN EQUITABLE 
ASSIGNMENT? 
 
In the leading contemporary text, Fisher on Mortgages
94
 dating from 1876, shortly after the 
Judicature Acts, the learned author explains that in English law there are two types of 
hypothecation (hypotheca being a non-possessory security interest imported into English law 
from Roman Law) which vest no absolute property in a creditor: 
“… nor any right of possession, but a right of realization by judicial process in case of non-
payment of the debt at the time fixed. This kind of security may be: - an Ordinary 
Hypothecation [as opposed to a maritime hypothecation], in the form of – 
A charge upon property, which does not imply a personal debt, but confers a mere right of 
realization by judicial process …; or 
An equitable assignment, which is an appropriation, for the payment of a debt, of property of 
the debtor in the hands of a third person…” 
Fisher notes that absolute assignments under s 25(6) “transfer the legal right in the 
property … and are therefore not strictly hypothecations.”95 As support for these statements, 
Fisher cites Stainbank v Shepard
96
 where Parke B. explained something of the nature of 
hypotheca:  
“this power does not extend to more than hypothecation,- well known in the civil law, and 
distinguished from a mortgage, as well as a pledge or pawn at common law the former 
transfers the property; the latter, a lien on the chattel, and is void without actual possession: 
but hypothecation gives only a right, to be enforced against the subject of it through the 
medium of process.”97  
Fisher also cites (amongst other cases
98
) Smith v Everett
99
 where a direction by the 
assignor to pay monies to be received in the future to specified assignees was held to create a 
“lien”100 on the fund: “There could not be a stronger appropriation of the fund than this.”101 
It is interesting to note that both Professor Pennington
102
 and Professor Goode
103
 have 
tied the juridical nature of the floating charge to the hypotheca.
104
 A number of cases
105
 have 
                                                          
94
 W.R. Fisher The Law of Mortgage and other securities upon property (3
rd
 ed Vol 1, London: Butterworths, 
1876) at p. 7.   
95
 W.R. Fisher The Law of Mortgage and other securities upon property (3
rd
 ed Vol 1, London: Butterworths, 
1876) at 7. It is interesting to note that the Times of 4th July 1872 at page 11 announced the appointment of a 
new secretary to the Judicature Commission. He was Robert Alexander Fisher and is described in the Times as 
“the author of several legal works, including a Digest in five volumes of the Law of Mortgages.” The Times 
mistakes R.A. Fisher for W.R. Fisher who was the author of the Digest. As seen from the quotation in the text, 
W.R. Fisher clearly understood the difference between a mortgage and a charge. He understood very clearly that 
an equitable assignment did not involve a transfer of title but instead created a security interest in the assignee 
akin to a charge. 
96
 (1853) 13 CB. 418, 138 ER 1262. 
97
 (1853) 13 CB. 418, 138 ER 1262 at 442-443, 1271. 
98
 Burn v Carvalho (1839) 4 My & C 690; 41 ER 265; Ex parte Steward (1845) 3 M D and De G265, Williams v 
Everett (1811) 14 East 582; 104 ER 725 and Baron v Husband; (1833) 4 B & Ad 611; 110 ER 586. 
99
 (1792) 4 Bro C C 64; 29 ER 780. 
100
 (1792) 4 Bro C C 64; 29 ER 780, at 67; 782 per Lord Commissioner Eyre.   
101
 (1792) 4 Bro C C 64; 29 ER 780, at 67; 782 per Lord Commissioner Eyre.  
102
 Pennington “The Genesis of the Floating Charge” (1960) 23 Modern Law Review 630 at 634. 
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Feldman and Meisel) (London: Lloyds of London, 1996) 193 at 195. 
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 For an alternative view of the development of the law relating to secured lending in England see R. Gregory 
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Quarterly 123. 
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 See eg Biggerstaff v Rowatt’s Wharf Ltd [1896] 2 Ch 93 at 101 and 106; NW Robbie & Co Ltd v Witney 
Warehouse Co Ltd [1963] 1 WLR 1324 at 1337, 1338, 1339 and 1340; Rother Iron Works Ltd v Canterbury 
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explained that prior to crystallisation, a floating charge is inchoate in that the company is able 
to continue to deal in the ordinary course of business with the assets subject to the charge. 
Once the floating charge crystallises, becoming fixed in nature, the assets subject to the 
charge are said to be effectively assigned in equity. An equitable charge is, or causes, an 
equitable assignment of the charged assets. The courts treat an equitable charge as an 
equitable assignment.
106
 
It is very easy to see that the effect of an equitable assignment of a chose in action 
operates very much like a floating charge.
 107
 The assignor creates a security interest over the 
chose in in action favour of the assignee. Until notice is provided to the debtor, the chose in 
action remains under the control of the assignor. This is similar to the situation where a 
company executes a floating charge. Only upon crystallisation are the charged assets taken 
outside of the chargor’s control. With an equitable assignment, the debtor is entitled to pay 
the debt owed, in the ordinary course of business, to the assignor until the debtor receives 
notice of the assignment in favour of the assignee
108
 (in the same way as a debtor whose debt 
is subject to a floating charge). The effect of an equitable assignment, whether described as 
creating a charge, a lien, an hypotheca or a trust in favour of the assignee, is effectively 
similar to a floating charge. All are, in Fisher’s words, forms of hypothecation. All are forms 
of security. 
In modern day invoice discounting arrangements, an equitable assignment by a 
company permits the company to continue to collect the debts (the debtor being wholly 
unaware of the arrangement) and although the company may have contractual restrictions 
upon it as to how it deals with the proceeds of those debts, the power to collect and to pay 
those debts to the assignee suggests sufficient licence to make the security floating rather than 
satisfying the more stringent requirements of a fixed charge.
 109
 Without notice being served 
on the debtor, there is nothing which stops the assignor from effectively assigning the same 
debts to others.
110
 Individual invoice discounting arrangements may or may not be found 
sufficiently restrictive to qualify as a fixed charge. It is clearly arguable that if, as is usual, an 
assignor is contractually required to pay the proceeds of debts, assigned in equity, into a 
particular bank account over which only the assignee has control, sufficient control is being 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
securitisation the Court of Appeal accepted that the equitable assignment created a charge (Titan Europe 2006-3 
plc v Colliers International UK plc [2015] EWCA Civ 1083 at [26 – 27]). 
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 See eg Masri v Consolidated Contractors International (UK) Ltd (No 2) [2009] QB 450 at [65] where 
Lawrence Collins LJ refers to: “the assignment of the debt to the debenture holder which took place (as a matter 
of English law) on crystallisation of the floating charge.” 
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 The classic statement of how a floating charge operates is often taken from Romer LJ in Re Yorkshire 
Woolcombers Association Ltd  [1903] 2 Ch 284 at 295: “(i) If it is a charge on a class of assets of a company 
present and future; (ii) if that class is one which, in the ordinary course of the business of the company, would 
be changing from time to time; and (iii) if you find that by the charge it is contemplated that, until some future 
step is taken by or on behalf of those interested in the charge, the company may carry on its business in the 
ordinary way as far as concerns the particular class of assets I am dealing with.” 
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 It was said by Sir Thomas Plumer MR in Dearle v Hall (1828) 3 Russ 1 at 12; 38 ER 475 at 479, in the 
context of an assignment of an equitable interest that “wherever it was intended to complete a transfer of a chose 
in action, there was a mode of dealing which a court of equity considered tantamount to possession, namely, 
notice given to the legal depositary of the fund.” This requirement for notice in the context of choses in action is 
the equivalent of control of a bank account required in the modern cases dealing with fixed charges on book 
debts such as Re Spectrum Plus Ltd [2005] 2 AC 680. 
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 See eg Re Spectrum Plus Ltd [2005] 2 AC 680 and Re Brumark Investments Ltd [2001] 2 AC 710. 
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 Lord Macnaghten in William Brandt’s Sons & Co v Dunlop Rubber Co Ltd [1905] AC 454 at 462 explained 
that where no notice is given to the debtor of an assignment, the debtor may pay the assignor. Until notice is 
given there is no irrevocable instruction to the debtor. “If the assignment be for valuable consideration and 
communicated to the third person, it cannot be revoked by the creditor or safely disregarded by the debtor.” The 
debt remains within the power of the company until such notice is served. 
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exercised to constitute the charge as fixed rather than floating. This would be a question of 
fact in each case.
111
  
Whether the equitable assignment of debts is seen as creating a fixed or a floating 
charge it will generally still need registration under the Companies Act 2006 otherwise it will 
be void against any subsequent liquidator, administrator or creditors of the company.
112
 
 
VII.  EFFECT OF GIVING NOTICE TO THE DEBTOR AND PRIORITY UNDER 
INSOLVENCY LEGISLATION 
 
(a) Notice to the debtor converts the equitable assignment (charge) into absolute 
ownership 
 
The practice of invoice discounters is to take an equitable assignment of a company’s debts 
but not to provide notice to the company’s debtors of the assignment unless the company 
defaults or enters an insolvency process. In equity, notice to the debtors is not necessary as 
between the assignor and the assignee but it is necessary to protect the assignee’s priority.113 
Clearly, notice provided by the assignee to the debtors will be effective under s 136 of the 
Law of Property Act 1925 to convert the equitable assignment into a legal assignment and to 
constitute the assignee the legal owner of the debts. Absolute ownership at law of the debts 
will be effectively transferred by the completion of the statutory assignment requirements. 
There is no time limit within which notice under s 136 must be given.
114
 
 
(b) Notice to the debtor after commencement of formal insolvency 
 
An example of an attempt to convert an equitable assignment into a legal assignment by 
notice to the debtor, in the context of an insolvent company is Gorringe.
115
 The Court of 
Appeal explained that notice to the debtor is unnecessary for an equitable assignment to be 
complete as between the assignor and the assignee.
116
 At the time of Gorringe, 1886, there 
was no requirement to register publicly company charges. The charge in Gorringe created by 
the equitable assignment was effective when it was made. The company was subsequently 
wound up by the court. After the date of the winding up petition, notice of the assignment 
was given by the assignee to the debtor in order to convert the equitable assignment into a 
legal assignment. The question before the Court was whether the assignee had priority in the 
liquidation due to either its initial equitable assignment or its subsequent attempt to convert it 
into a legal assignment. The Court held that as the notice to the debtor came after the petition, 
the assignee could not rely upon its legal assignment as any disposition of company property 
after the date of the petition would be void under s 153 of the Companies Act 1862 (the 
predecessor to today’s s 127 of the Insolvency Act 1986).117 The assignee was entitled to rely 
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 (1886) 34 Ch D 128 at 132 per Cotton LJ 
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 An interesting older bankruptcy case which may be compared with Gorringe is Re Atkinson (1851) 4 De G & 
Sm548; 64 ER 951; affirmed (1852) 2 De GM & G 140; 42 ER 824 where an assignment by an insolvent debtor 
after he had entered insolvency was held to be valid as the assignee did not have notice of the insolvency at the 
time of the insolvency. There was at the time no doctrine of constructive notice of insolvencies which had 
appeared in the Gazette and no equivalent of the current provision in s 284 of the Insolvency Act 1986 which 
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on the initial equitable assignment which pre-dated the winding up and was valid without the 
need for registration.  
 
(c) Consequences under current statutory registration regime 
 
Under the current regime, it is submitted that an equitable assignment of a debt, as it operates 
by way of charge, would be registrable under the Companies Act within 21 days of its 
creation otherwise it would be void against any subsequent liquidator, administrator or 
creditor of the company.
118
 If an invoice discounter takes an equitable assignment of a 
company’s book debts, that assignment will be void if it is not registered under the 
Companies Act.  
If notice is given to the company’s debtors of the assignment (thus perfecting the 
statutory assignment under s 136 of the Law of Property Act 1925) the assignee becomes the 
legal owner of the debts and may enforce them in its own name. If the notice is served on the 
debtors after the date of a winding up petition, the attempt to transfer the debts from the 
company to the assignee will be void under s 127 of the Insolvency Act 1986.
119
  
A similar result would be likely if the notice is served after the commencement of an 
administration. In that case the administration moratorium prevents enforcement of any 
security without leave of the court or consent of the administrator.
120
 The effect of serving a 
notice to perfect the legal assignment would be akin to foreclosure of a mortgage (where a 
debtor’s equity of redemption is cancelled and the mortgagee becomes legal owner)121 and 
would arguably fall within the moratorium. 
 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
 
An equitable assignment of a legal chose in action is not the same as a legal assignment. A 
legal assignment effectively transfers all the rights of the assignor to the assignee who may 
enforce those rights in place of the assignor. An equitable assignment does not effect such a 
transfer of rights but instead creates equitable rights in the assignee. The assignor holds the 
benefit of the chose in action on behalf of the assignee whose interest over the chose in 
action is in the form of an equitable charge. All equitable assignments of legal choses in 
action create charges over those choses in action. They do not operate by way of transfer of 
the legal chose in action. Although the nature of the rights given by an equitable assignment 
might be seen as a purely academic issue, it could not be further from the truth. Billions of 
pounds are invested in U.K. businesses with the financier having the comfort of an equitable 
assignment of book debts. The rights of those financiers, on the insolvency of the assignor, 
turn upon whether they are seen as being absolute owners or merely chargees of those debts. 
If written notice of an equitable assignment of a legal chose in action is given to the 
debtor, the effect of s 136 of the Law of Property Act 1925 is to convert the equitable 
assignment (or charge over the chose in action) into absolute legal ownership (subject to 
equities). The act of giving notice, under the statutory machinery, is sufficient to convert an 
equitable charge into legal ownership. The notice acts as a disposition of the assignor’s 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
avoids dispositions of property by debtors once a bankruptcy has commenced (the individual insolvency 
equivalent of s 127 of the Insolvency Act 1986). 
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discretion is under s 112 see eg Re Dicksmith (Manufacturing) Ltd [1999] 2 BCLC 686). 
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 On the remedy of foreclosure see eg Re Owen [1894] Ch 220 and the very clear explanation of the remedy in 
R. Calnan Taking Security Law and Practice (2
nd
 ed, Bristol: Jordans, 2011) at paras 8.53- 8.66. 
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property as the legal ownership is transferred from the assignor to the assignee. There is no 
time limit at law restricting when this conversion may take place but under insolvency 
legislation, any attempt to dispose of company property will be ineffective once insolvency 
proceedings for compulsory liquidation or administration are under way. 
The majority practice of receivables financiers, in conducting business as invoice 
discounters, is to take equitable assignments of book debts but not to provide notice to 
debtors of those assignments until the assignor is nearing or entering insolvency. If invoice 
discounters fail to give notice to debtors prior to their assignor entering formal insolvency 
proceedings, such as compulsory liquidation or administration, the invoice discounters’ 
interest cannot be converted into absolute ownership under s 136 of the Law of Property Act 
1925. They will remain as equitable assignees with the benefit of an unregistered charge over 
the debts which will be void in the assignor’s insolvency and reduce their priority standing to 
that of unsecured creditor.  
The timing of the notice to the debtor is therefore critical. If given prior to the 
insolvency, the invoice discounter will be safe as it will be the owner of the debts. If given 
after the insolvency, the invoice discounter will be a lowly unsecured creditor proving in the 
assignor’s insolvency. 
It is perhaps time for the U.K. government to consider how the law should deal with 
the interests of receivables financiers. Although it is perfectly reasonable for receivables 
financiers to protect their interests in the way they do, it is inconsistent with over a hundred 
years of Parliamentary policy to permit such a financier to have the benefit of a secret 
document (that is, an unregistered equitable assignment) which remains undetectable until the 
company becomes insolvent. At this point, by giving notice to the company’s creditors, the 
financier is able to take legal title to all the company’s book debts at the expense of the 
company’s general body of creditors. It is common for such financiers not only to be repaid 
their investment with interest but also to charge significant extra fees.  
The history of security law suggests that there is a cycle whereby financiers find legal 
mechanisms to protect fully their interests to the detriment of other creditors. Parliament has 
frequently stepped in to create an even balance for all stakeholders in an insolvency.
122
 
Parliament may wish to look at debt factoring and invoice discounting and consider explicitly 
classifying such agreements as security interests registrable under the Companies Act.
123
 This 
would potentially provide more transparency in corporate dealings and also free up assets so 
that more money is paid to unsecured creditors and is available to insolvency office holders 
who wish to consider rescuing a distressed business. The historical analysis provided above 
suggests that the current state of the law appears to turn on some fine conceptual distinctions. 
The overwhelming priority currently claimed by receivables financiers is a “real world” 
issue. A legislative categorisation of such interests as security interests requiring public 
registration may serve to introduce a more balanced approach to such financing. This would 
also ensure that the UK remains in step with other progressive nations. 
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The current practice of receivables financiers might be viewed in a manner consistent 
with the observations of Lord Esher MR from the end of the nineteenth century, in relation to 
what appeared to be a new type of business involving the assignment of significant quantities 
of debts, which his Lordship suggested: “might perhaps be considered by some an evil.”124 It 
would be timely for Parliament once again to consider how the market in book debts should 
be regulated. 
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